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POLITICS AND PRIVACY: REFINING THE
ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN FETAL
TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION*
NICOLAS P. TERRY**
I. INTRODUCTION
It should come as little surprise that the ethical and legal treatment
afforded fetal tissue transplantation will be influenced by the abortion
debate. However, when the extent and dimensions of that synergy are
analyzed, it is difficult not to conclude that we are faced with a pur-
poseful confusion of the issues destined to pre-empt any meaningful dis-
cussion of fetal tissue transplantation. The issues identified are not so
much ethical concerns, but instead reflect settled positions taken for stra-
tegic reasons. What could have been identified as discrete legal problems
turn out to be recycled arguments as to privacy and reproductive auton-
omy. Herein lies a considerable irony. For those opposed to either abor-
tion or fetal tissue transplantation, the effective strategy is to press the
link between the two issues. For the proponent of tissue transplantation
the political strategy is to maintain the issues as separate. However,
when the proponent rallies her legal arguments she must confront, in-
deed utilize, abortion-related principles. And, if our policy-makers and
judges have in fact become locked into positions on this issue by their
stance on the abortion debate, it may well be that the fetal tissue debate is
over before it has begun.
II. ETHICAL ISSUES
There are always some fringe elements who oppose any human inter-
vention from conception through birth, be it abortion, tissue transplanta-
tion, or even therapeutic fetal surgery or ultrasonography. However, in
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practice, the most extreme position likely to be encountered in organized
opposition to fetal tissue transplantation may be characterized with the
slogan "fetus as person." At this extreme, any intrusive intervention in-
volving the fetus, or subjugation of the interests of the fetus (interests
presumably identified by persons) to the interests of a person is consid-
ered ethically unacceptable. In this camp, abortion is regarded as the
ultimate offense. Adherents to these views immediately integrate any
consideration of fetal tissue transplantation into the ethics of the preced-
ing abortion, leading to statements such as, "[t]he abuse is not in the sale
of those tissues, but in killing the baby in the first place."' The opposite
extreme may be depicted by the position that "tissue is tissue;" abortion
is legal and the fetus should not be dignified to a greater degree than any
other piece of tissue surgically removed from a woman.
As is usually the case, however, the debate will concentrate in the mid-
dle of these extreme positions, where one may identify differently articu-
lated convictions as to the permissible level of reification of the fetus.2
The tolerable level of reification (and its pejoratively styled legal relative,
alienation') itself is a function either of a belief in what the fetus is or
what it has the potential to become.' Interestingly, that recognition of
1. Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988 at 49 (quoting Dr. John
Willke, President, National Right to Life Committee). This was echoed by a statement from the
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, a British anti-abortion group, following the first fetal
cell implant there, proclaiming that fetal tissue transplantation amounts to "the deliberate killing of
unborn children for transplantation spare parts," N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at C9, col. 3.
2. See, e.g., Will, Respecting the Human Body, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1985, at A23, col. 3.
Human beings are neither mindless matter nor minds isolated from the physical matter
of bodies. Ideas and even minds may be intangible, but particular ones belong to particular
"embodied" persons-persons with bodily natures. To be human is to be "embodied," to
have the form, powers, capabilities and limits of the human body.
The instinct to show some respect toward any human body-even a cadaver, even an
aborted fetus-is natural, and is not a mere residue of pre-scientific superstition. It ex-
presses the felt conviction that a body is never "merely" a body, because a human being is
never merely a ghost in a corporeal machine.
3. See generally Terry, "Alas! Poor Yorick"IKnew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo
and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419,
432-38 (1986). For a discussion of appropriate levels of commodification or market-alienation of
children, see Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978);
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Posner, The Regulation of the Mar-
ket in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59 (1987).
4. le., the level of reification turns on whether one views a fetus as a person rather than, say,
an older organ. See Nathan, Fetal Research: An Investigator's View, 22 VILL. L. REV. 384, 390
(1976-77). For a telling example of the potentiality argument as seen by an anti-Roe Justice, see
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986):
However one answers the metaphysical or theological question whether the fetus is a
"human being" or the legal question whether it is a "person" as that term is used in the
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potential remains relevant for many in determining the ethical approach
to tissue transplantation, even when termination of the fetus has made it
clear that such potential will never be fulfilled.
It is those who inhabit the broad middle ground of attitudes toward
fetal tissue transplantation who seem most susceptible to the argument
that some ethical division exists which is supportable on the basis of the
abortion typology: a distinction based on whether the purpose of the
abortion was contraceptive rather than tissue farming. Notwithstanding
any ethical import this distinction might convey, it is singularly ineffec-
tive in the real world. First, it is flawed in practice because women who
abort may have mixed motives. Second, it is overly narrow. In the vast
gulf between contraceptive and tissue farming motives, there are numer-
ous additional concerns, such as genetic and therapeutic, that motivate
abortions.
Any discussion of motivation spills over into ethical concerns regard-
ing incentives to abort prior to any transplantation. There are two
concerns here. One is the straightforward incentive issue: the encourage-
ment of abortion is wrong or, at least, distasteful. This position may be
held by those on either side of the abortion rights debate. The second
concern is more subtle and, I believe, more important. It is the fear that
permitting the commercialization of the fetal tissue transplantation sys-
tem will result in the exploitation of the women who bear tissue for profit
and of the critically ill patients who want to acquire it. This important
ethical question frequently becomes distorted because the debate con-
fuses the technology with its practitioners' motives. For example, there
is arguably nothing wrong with in vitro fertilization and surrogacy.
What is wrong and what may justify regulation is commercialized ex-
ploitation and de-humanization of the woman, the recipient, and perhaps
the fetus.5
Constitution, one must at least recognize, first, that the fetus is an entity that bears in its
cells all the genetic information that characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens
and distinguishes an individual member of that species from all others, and second, that
there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus from a child or, indeed, an adult human
being.
Id. at 2195-96 (White, J., dissenting).
5. The well-known New Jersey surrogacy case, In the Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988), held a surrogacy contract to be in conflict with public policy and aspects of New Jersey family
law. Currently, thirty-four states are considering legislation designed to regulate surrogacy. N.Y.
Times, Jun. 26, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 6, 11, col. 3 (nat'l ed.). Following recommendations contained in
the REPORT OF THE COMMITEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY,
CMD. 9314, § 8.18 (1984) (commonly referred to as the Warnock Report), Great Britain introduced
1988]
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Certainly, the abortion/tissue transplantation relationship is not a triv-
ial one. First, factors in the abortion procedure affect the usefulness of
the tissue for transplantation. When researchers need tissue for experi-
mentation, it may well be the case that liberal abortion laws make it more
difficult to acquire good tissue because they tend to facilitate earlier abor-
tions.6 However, the comfort of that palliative is not available in the
tissue transplantation debate because studies suggest that the products of
early abortions produce better results upon transplantation.7 This fact
raises the potential problem of researchers influencing the timing of the
abortion decision.
A problem related to the question of abortion timing8 concerns a
transplanter's preferences as to the condition of the fetal tissue following
the abortion procedure. A transplant team might prefer the fetal tissue
to be fresh or, in some sense, "living." Novel ethical and legal9 questions
then arise as to the definition of death applicable to an aborted pre-viable
fetus, and the appropriateness of tissue removal before all signs of "life"
are extinguished."0
Second, unlike other uses of fetal tissue, such as experimentation, with
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, which is aimed at those negotiating surrogacy arrange-
ments on a commercial basis, rather than the mother or future "parents."
Commercialization of fetuses has also been the target of recent legislation affecting in vitro fertili-
zation. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 451.015 (1987)
(prohibiting market transfers of human embryos).
6. See, e.g., Levine, The Impact on Fetal Research of the Report of the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 22 VILL. L. REV. 367,
369-70 (1976-77).
7. See, eg., Mahowald, Silver & Ratcheson, The Ethical Options In Transplanting Fetal Tis-
sue, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Feb. 1987, at 9, 10. This has been indicated from the earliest trans-
plantations of fetal monkey tissue. N.Y. Times, Jul. 6, 1985, § 1, at 6, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). With regard
to human fetal pancreas transplants, it seems crucial to remove the fetal pancreas when only the islet
(insulin producing) cells have developed, prior to the development of extraneous tissue which causes
rejection. Thus, transplantation should take place prior to a sixteen week gestational age, see L.A.
Times, Sep. 18, 1985, § 1, at 3, col. 1, or even earlier, McAuliffe, A Startling Fount of Healing, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 1986, at 68. Even fetal islet cells, however, have to be stripped of
trigger antigens prior to transplantation. Dorfman, Help from the Unborn, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987 at
62.
8. Certainly, since the earliest rodent experiments, the gestational age of the fetus has been of
crucial importance to success of the transplantation. See supra note 7.
9. Eg., one legal question is whether the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act's prohibition of exper-
imentation on a live fetus would apply if tissue was withdrawn prior to the "death" of the fetus. 8A
U.L.A. 34, 15-67 (1987).
10. For exmaple, see the allegations which were made by the Foundation on Economic Trends
against the National Disease Research Interchange, that fetal tissue is removed without regard to the
usual death verification safeguards. Wash. Post, Sep. 9, 1987, at A4, col. 1.
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transplantation one cannot sidestep the ethical problems associated with
abortion. When resisting ethical condemnation or legal regulation of fe-
tal experimentation, it is traditional for its proponents to point out that
the abortion debate is irrelevant because the fetal researcher would be as
content to utilize the product of a spontaneous abortion (or miscarriage)
as of an induced procedure.'" However, this avenue of enlightened re-
treat is unavailable to the transplanter, because sanctioning the use of
spontaneously aborted tissue for transplantation into a human involves
distinct ethical problems.1 2
Third, a real connection may exist between the volume of transplants
and the volume of abortions. At first sight the perceived "encourage-
ment," (if not "legitimation" or "entrenchment") link between fetal
transplants and induced abortion may appear defused because of the an-
nual availability of one to two million aborted fetuses.1 3 In the United
States alone, however, ten million people suffer from diabetes 14 ten per
cent of whom must make regular use of insulin.15 Of course, in these
days of rampant cost containment, it may seem whimsical to consider
11. This distinction has particular importance given the fact that many states tend to concen-
trate their regulatory efforts on the remains of induced abortions, thus opening up the possibility of a
"rational connection" constitutional challenge. See infra text accompanying note 108.
12. Specifically, the problem arises whether a researcher should use tissue which for genetic or
other reasons, known or unknown, has been spontaneously aborted. See generally Dorfman, Help
From the Unborn, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987 at 62. Notwithstanding, researchers in Australia switched
from using induced to spontaneously aborted fetuses after protests from anti-abortion groups. L.A.
Times, Sep. 18, 1985, § 1, at 3, col. 1. Further, the reported first fetal brain tissue transplantations
performed in Mexico involved spontaneously aborted tissue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, at B13, col. 1,
and when the Assistant Secretary of Health refused his consent to a proposed transplantation proce-
dure, he did not ban transplantation of spontaneously aborted material, see infra note 131.
13. The latest figures available for U.S. abortions in 1985, are 1,588,550 induced terminations
and 910,967 spontaneous abortions. Telephone interview with the Alan Guttmacher Institute of
New York (July 1988). Furthermore, research indicates that spontaneous abortions occur in 31% of
pregnancies. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
14. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1983, at Cl, col. 5. According to a study by one U.S. drug company,
more than 15 million people in the United States are diabetics, of which four to five million are
undiagnosed and five million are pre-diabetic, Treating Diabetes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1983, at
70 (U.S. edition).
15. Furthermore, insulin alleviates the symptoms but does not cure the disease. For example,
regular use of insulin does not prevent the onset of many problems associated with diabetes, such as:
diabetic retinopathy, i.e., blindness, see L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (Diabetes causes
15% of all blindness); loss of limbs, see L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, § 1, at 3. col. 1 (Diabetes is the
second-most-common cause of amputations); renal failure; heart disease; and often, premature
death. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1983, at Cl, col. 5. A diabetic diagnosed before the age of 30 has only a
fifty per cent chance of reaching the age of 50. Treating Diabetes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1983 at
70 ( U.S. edition). Diabetes kills 300,000 people per year in the United States. Bylinsky, Closing in
on a Cure for Diabetes, FORTUNE, Aug. 6, 1984, at 70.
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that any major program of transplantation of insulin-producing fetal
pancreas cells would be undertaken. However, fetal tissue transplanta-
tion already is running ahead of its predicted schedule,16 and it is short-
sighted to ignore the possibility that further breakthroughs might make
mass treatment possible and dramatically increase the demand for
aborted tissue. Add into the equation the two and one half million
Alzheimer's patients whose neural pathways have deteriorated and some
500,000 to one million Parkinson's disease sufferers 17 who might benefit
from dopamine-producing 8 fetal brain cells19 and shortages may soon
result.20 Any concerns that a tissue shortage will encourage abortions
will only be heightened as researchers find new uses for fetal tissue,2 and
an unfortunate biotechnical squeeze play would result from improved
contraceptive methodologies leading to any decrease in the U.S. abortion
rate.22
16. See generally Gorman, Steps Toward a Brave New World, TIME, Jul. 13, 1987, at 56. The
earliest experimenters on rodents suggested that human applications would not be possible until the
1990's. Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1980, at A16, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Jul. 5, 1983, at Cl, col. 4. However,
the first human fetal tissue transplants in the United States were lerformed in 1985. L.A. Times,
Sep. 18, 1985, § 1, at 3, col. I. The first transplantations of fetal brain tissue into Parkinson's disease
patients occurred in Mexico in 1987. L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, § 1, at 17, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1988, at B13, col. 1. One research group in France has been transplanting fetal tissue into patients
with congenital immunodeficiencies since 1974. J.-L. Touraine & F. Touraine, Greffe de tissus
foetaux: aspects medicaux et ethiques, 27 (9) AGRESSOLOGIE, 771 (1986).
17. One report, however, suggests that as few as 50,000 such patients might prove suitable for
transplant surgery. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at A21, col. 1.
18. Dopamine is a neurochemical linked to motor coordination. Parkinson's disease occurs
when more than 80% of a person's dopamine-producing cells are missing.
19. Wash. Post, Jul. 5, 1985, at A4, col. 1 (detailing success in transplantation of fetal
dopamine-producing cells from monkey fetuses into afflicted monkeys).
20. According to Lee Ducat of the National Disease Research Interchange, a shortage of fetal
cells for research already exists, prompting scientists to persist with animal tissue studies, BUs. WK.,
Dec. 7, 1987, at 116.
21. For example, transplanting human fetal tissue into rodents which are then used for testing
drugs might demonstrate the teratogenetic effects of such drugs on fetuses in utero, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 2, 1982, at C3, col. 1. Other suggested uses include treating damaged spinal cords and cor-
recting brain cell degeneration associated with Huntington's chorea, N.Y. Times, Jul. 5, 1983, at Cl,
col. 4; multiple sclerosis, TIME, Aug. 8, 1983 at 59; infertility, L.A. Times, Apr. 10, 1986, § 1, at 1,
col. 1; and blood disorders such as leukemia, aplastic anemia, sickle-cell anemia, and thalassemia.
McAuliffe, A Startling Fount of Healing, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 1986 at 68; Dorfman,
Help from the Unborn, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987 at 62. See generally, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1987, at Cl,
col. 3.
The most highly publicized, though ultimately unsuccessful, use of fetal tissue transplantation was
performed by Dr. Robert Gale of UCLA who transplanted fetal liver cells into six victims of the
1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1987, § 1, at 1,
col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
22. According to a study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute of New York, the United States'
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/4
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Certainly, there are sufficient market incentives to spur continued re-
search in all these fields.2 3 At present, however, there appears to be no
market system (white, grey or even black) in place involving the supply
of fetal tissue,24 although, that could change rapidly. The tissue trans-
plantation scenario features low producer (abortee) costs and low pro-
ducer valuation of aborted tissue coupled with particularly high
consumer (e.g., Parkinson's disease patient) value. Given the obstacles to
these groups negotiating directly, this price disparity should attract mid-
dlemen, whose early transactions probably will feature overreaching until
increased middlemen competition, or consumer access to producers,
reduces consumer cost. Beyond that initial stage of market development,
any continued consumer shortage of tissue should stimulate production.
Indeed, at the macro level, eventually we might see a net flow of foreign
tissue into the United States from countries with high abortion rates and
low level bio-medical technology."
One potential answer to the ethical concerns some have with regard to
encouraging abortions is to transplant laboratory grown cells rather than
cells recovered from aborted tissue.26 A slightly different approach, al-
beit one bringing along its own ethical baggage, would be to harvest the
tissue from laboratory conceived embryos. After all, in the United
States, there is comparatively little regulation of embryo experimenta-
tion,27 and such experimentation would be difficult to control under cur-
rent and proposed regulation of fetal tissue transplantation28 .
comparatively low level of contraceptive use was responsible for its high abortion rate. The study
also concluded, "[Women in the United States have an average of 2.56 pregnancies during their
reproductive years. Based on current abortion rates, the researchers project that among every 100
women in the United States, there will be 76 abortions, with some women having more than one."
N.Y. Times, Jun. 2, 1988, at A22, col. I.
23. One estimate has put the U.S. market for pancreatic islet cells at $600 million per year.
Bylinsky, Closing in on a Cure for Diabetes, FORTUNE, Aug. 6, 1984, at 70.
24. Fetal tissue currently being used for experimental purposes in the United States generally is
harvested by the nonprofit National Disease Research Interchange, a clearinghouse established by
the National Institutes of Health. There would appear to be no allocation through price mecha-
nisms. As demand is stimulated, supply will have to become more elastic to avoid, for example,
rationing.
25. Lest this be thought an exaggeration, it should be noted that at least one state has reacted to
the general scarcity of organs for donation by directing its organ procurement agencies to give pref-
erential treatment to state residents. 1987 Ga. Laws 1101 (H.B. 541).
26. This is the main avenue of research being explored by Hana Biologics, Inc. of California.
Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1987, at 116.
27, See Terry, supra note 3, at 462-66.
28. See infra text accompanying note 64.
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III. THE OVERLOOKED OR IGNORED: DONOR AND DONEE
An often forgotten factor distinguishes the fetal tissue transplantation
debate from the traditional abortion or fetal experimentation scenario.
Transplantation alone involves an immediate and needy third party, the
critical diabetic or Parkinson's disease patient,29 not "tainted" by any
termination decision and for whom the fetal tissue constitutes one final
hope. While the existence of this interested third party will not suffice to
support any exotic theory of constitutional rebuke for anti-transplanta-
tion legislation, it should affect the ethical landscape.
For the diabetic or brain-diseased patient, fetal tissue offers the most
consistent hope. Only 18 per cent of the 316 human pancreas, as op-
posed to fetal pancreas, transplants performed in the United States in the
past two decades have been successful. 30 Transplantation of the patient's
own adrenal gland tissue into the brain to treat Parkinson's disease has
had mixed results, 31 and is intrinsically limited as a methodology because
most of the other human cells needed for transplantation into the brain
are unavailable outside the brain.32 Further, in all cases, the immunolog-
ical naivet and regenerative properties of the fetal cells make them the
preferred source of tissue.33
Even those opposed to fetal tissue transplantation show some concern
for the potential donee. In contrast, such opponents frequently cast the
donor-the abortee-as the ultimate villain. Of course, that characteri-
zation is understandable from those who concentrate on the detriment to
the fetus rather than the benefit to the woman. From the woman's per-
spective, however, the donation of the tissue might provide a beneficial
29. A moving sketch of the Parkinson's disease patient is portrayed in Mahowald, Silver &
Ratcheson, supra note 7, at 10.
30. Bylinsky, Closing in on a Cure for Diabetes, FORTUNE, Aug. 6, 1984, at 70. In general,
tissue rejection of the whole human pancreas has been impossible to overcome. L.A. Times, Sep. 18,
1985, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
31. N.Y. Times, Sep. 11, 1984, at Cl, col. 2; McAuliffe, A Startling Fount of Healing, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 1986, at 68; 257 J.A.M.A. 2691 (1987). Recently, there has been
considerable skepticism voiced by U.S. researchers over the claims of success by Mexican surgeons.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1988, at Al, col. 4, Aug. 30, 1988, at A17, col. 1.
32. For example, cells producing brain hormones such as norepinephrine and acetychloline are
unavailable outside the brain and brain tissue transplantation is not yet feasible. L.A. Times, Apr.
10, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1. See also L.A. Times, Jul. 5, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
33. Dorfman, Help from the Unborn, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987 at 62. However, considerable re-
search continues into the possibility of using animal tissue, N.Y. Times, Jul. 1, 1987, at A20, col. 4.
Also it must be recognized that early fetal tissue transplant experiments have been disappointing.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1988, at A15, col.l.
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psychological release.34 For some women, this release might be "guilt"
motivated. For others, the emotions that they would assuage through a
donation of fetal tissue are more complex. For example, there have been
reports of women carrying fetuses diagnosed as anencephalic wishing to
donate their organs or tissue for transplantation.35
IV. ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL PROTECTION
Little, if any, objection to fetal tissue transplantation seems to exist
simply because it involves transplantation. Transplantation appears gen-
erally accepted, although forthcoming problems involving, for example,
organ donations from anencephalic newborns and cadavers will re-open
aspects of that debate such as the definition of death and the preservation
of the donor's dignity.36 Indeed, one must recognize that most of the
ethical objections to fetal tissue transplantation are in fact not even direct
attacks on tissue transplantation. The fetal tissue question's inextricable
embroilment in the abortion debate suggests that many of the ethical
complaints with regard to the utilization of fetal tissue are in fact trig-
gered by abortion concerns, and aimed at minimizing abortions.37
Indeed, the characterization of the arguments against fetal tissue trans-
plantation as essentially ethical misses the point. They are ethical in that
abortion, experimentation, and transplantation all have been viewed as
exploitive of the fetus for the ends of the person. However, the motiva-
tion for promoting such debate is less ethically-based than it is strategi-
cally and politically-based.38 There is more going on here than
34. See generally Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Apr. 1987, at 21, 30.
35. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at A23, col. 2, detailing attempts of an anencephalic's
parents to donate the body of the child, and noting that U.S. transplant centers tend to turn down
such donors because of legal problems with the definition of death in such cases. The most famous
case is that of the Canadian, "Baby Gabriel," detailed in TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49.
36. For example, many will be troubled anew by the applicable definition of death in such cases.
See, e.g., Harrison, Organ Procurement for Children: The Anencephalic Fetus as Donor, THE LAN-
CET, Dec. 13, 1986, at 1383, 1384-85. See generally Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 29, 1988, at 1.
Still further new concerns-this time as to the dignity and resultant "humanness" of the donee-will
arise if the transplantation of animal organs into humans progresses beyond the experimental stage.
See, e.g., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jul. 31, 1988, at D9, col. 1, relating British discovery of method to
reduce human rejection of pigs' kidneys and hearts.
37. Anti-abortion activists in Australia were quick to direct their protests at the earliest fetal
pancreas research which was being performed exclusively with and on rodent tissue. N.Y. Times,
May. 10, 1983, at Cl, col. 5.
38. Of course, it could be argued that the abortion debate is, itself, a feature of a broader socio-
economic struggle. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455-7 (1977),
1988]
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symbolism; every fetal "right" recognized furthers a circumscription of a
woman's reproductive behavior and every state statute which is chal-
lenged before the courts brings closer the re-examination and ultimate
demise of Roe v. Wade.
V. POLITICS AND ABORTION REFORM LEGISLATION
The political activity engendered by protestations that fetal tissue
transplantation and research will legitimize, encourage or entrench abor-
tion advances a quite fundamental stratagem adopted by the anti-abor-
tion lobby. This stratagem involves continual onslaughts on the
penumbra of Roe v. Wade.39 Thus, attacks have been made on the public
funding of abortions, tort wrongful life actions, and the disposal of fetal
remains. The stratagem is a sound one, not least because it keeps abor-
tion or abortion-related issues before legislatures and courts.
Central to the politics of the fetal tissue debate is the encourage/supply
relationship between abortion and tissue transplantation. This could be
challenged by the figures tending to show that, at the moment, the supply
of fetuses outstrips demand from researchers.' However, the politics of
the link make it too important for anti-abortion proponents to discard.
First, maintaining the link transforms every criticism of fetal tissue trans-
plantaton into a symbolic attack on abortion itself. Second, it furthers
the goal of political litigation, i.e., arguing a "fresh" issue before the
courts. Third, it widens the constituency for regulation beyond those
who object to fetal tissue transplantation to the full range of abortion
foes.4 1
As the court well knows, these [state Medicaid] regulations [denying abortion funding to
contraceptive abortions] inevitably will have the practical effect of preventing nearly all
poor women from obtaining safe and legal abortions. The enactments challenged here
brutally coerce poor women to bear children whom society will scorn for every day of their
lives. Many thousands of unwanted minority and mixed-race children now spend blighted
lives in foster homes, orphanages and "reform" schools. Many children of the poor, sadly,
will attend second-rate segregated schools... I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of
those who preach a "right to life" that means, under present social politics, a bare exist-
ence in utter misery for so many poor women and their children.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
Notwithstanding, positions taken on abortion remain the touchstones of general political
orientation.
39. For example, see the Pennsylvania debate reported in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1984).
40. See supra text accompanying note 13.
41. The link may also have an interesting micro-political dynamic, in that those who are not
opposed to fetal tissue transplantation may fear being characterized as pro-abortion unless they act
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VI. POLITICS AND ABORTION LITIGATION
Although pro-choice groups only recently have begun to move more
onto the offensive,42 the courts seem aware that they are a battleground
of choice in a stage of a war which, primarily, is about politics and media
exposure.43
The primary reason for heightening the debate over fetal disposal and
experimentation was that, in the post-Roe wave of refurbished state abor-
tion statutes, the state legislatures included disposal and experimentation
controls in the statutes as invitations for the courts to further delineate
the limits of the reproductive autonomy principle. This inclusive ap-
proach is not to be confused with the elevating of issues to facilitate pub-
lic debate. Rather, it seeks to conclude any such debate by welding the
bond between abortion and fetal disposal. If the pattern of post-Roe leg-
islation continues,' it seems highly likely that the next wave of state
statutes will include the regulation of fetal tissue transplantation. A pro-
posed California statute would have proven to be an exception. The bill
contained a general approval of such research and transplantation.45
against it, and those who are opposed to fetal tissue use may refrain from action to avoid an anti-
abortion label.
42. For example, in Bering v. Share, 106 Wash.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107
S. Ct. 940 (1987), the Supreme Court of Washington upheld an intricately worded permanent injunc-
tion limiting the quantity and quality of picketing at a medical clinic by an anti-abortion group.
(with one minor point to be modified on remand, id. at 935-38). See also Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 624 F.Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and remanded, 813 F.2d 53
(3d Cir. 1987), on remand, 665 F.Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987), 670 F.Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(abortion clinic successfully brings RICO action against abortion protesters).
43. Consider, for example, Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390 (6th
Cir. 1987), involving a city's fetal disposal law, which had been passed for largely symbolic and
political reasons. Dissenting from the court's grant of injunctive relief, Judge Nelson seemed to
suggest that the plaintiff's request for relief was as politically motivated. Id. at 1403.
44. See generally Pearson & Kurtz, The Abortion Controversy: A Study in Law and Politics, 8
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 427 (1985).
45. Proposed amendment to CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.8. S.B. No 2425 (intro-
duced by Senator Torres) [hereinafter S.B. No. 2425].
7151.8. Any woman of sound mind and 18 years of age or older who has suffered a fetal
loss may donate the fetus or any fetal part upon the death of the fetus.
(a) No consideration, including payment in the form of money or other valuables or in-
kind services may be offered to a pregnant woman to influence her decision to terminate
the pregnancy for the purposes of making a gift of the fetus or any fetal part under this
section.
(b) A gift of a fetus or any fetal part may be made only for the purposes of medical
research or therapeutic application. No specific or named individual may be designated as
a transplant recipient under this section.
(c) Any facility which receives a fetus or any fetal parts donated pursuant to this sec-
tion shall test the part designated to be transplanted to discover the presence of any infec-
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However, the bill was withdrawn after opposition from pro-life groups.
VII. STATE REGULATION OF FETAL DISPOSAL AND
EXPERIMENTATION
Some of the existing prohibitions on fetal disposal, 6 possession,47 dis-
position,48 and, most importantly, experimentation 49 may already apply
to fetal tissue transplantation. However, one can find little visible evi-
dence of any existing state enforcement practices."0 Indeed, the uncer-
tainties surrounding the reach of such state regulatory regimes may both
create a dangerous chilling effect on even peripheral research, and leave
the regimes exposed to constitutional attack.5
tious or contagious disease. Any fetal tissue found to be contaminated with such a disease
shall be isolated, clearly labeled as such, and made available only upon request.
(d) Prospective donors under this section shall be provided with consultation by the
attending physician and surgeon regarding the purposes and methodology of fetal dona-
tion.
(e) Any physician and surgeon participating in the procedures resulting in the loss of a
fetus shall not participate in the procedures for removing, processing, preserving, dispos-
ing, storing, maintaining quality control, transporting, or implanting a fetus or any part
thereof.
46. See Terry, supra note 3, at 428-30. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802 (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 390.001(7), 390.012 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4162 (McKin.
ney 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1.09 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5224 (1987); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-6-109 (1977).
47. See Terry, supra note 3, at 437-38.
48. See Terry, supra note 3, at 438 n.124. See also H.B. No. 1479, 84th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess.
§ 5 (1988) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.036).
49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802 (1987); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25956-25957 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West Supp.
1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 81-26(7) (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West
Supp. 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Law.
Co-op 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.15(2685-2692) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-20-108(3) (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-342 to -346 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A, -3,
-5 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Bald-
win 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Pur-
don 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17
(1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 394-208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo. STAT.
§ 35-6-115 (1977).
50. Cf. Culliton, Fetal Research (III): The Impact of a Massachusetts Law, 187 SCIENCE 1175
(1975).
51. Uncertainty as to the legality of contemplated conduct is indicia of unconstitutional vague-
ness. See infra text accompanying note 118.
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VIII. REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY AND TRANSPLANT
MOTIVATED ABORTIONS
As hasty state legislatures succeed in preempting a policy discussion of
fetal tissue transplants, and introduce prohibitions rather than more
measured responses, the debate will be forced into the courts. However,
whereas the introduction of the abortion issue into the ethical debate
over fetal tissue is a political stratagem, the abortion cases constitute a
vital component of the legal debate.
The relationship between abortion and fetal experimentation or trans-
plantation has a vitally important legal perspective. However, it is by no
means conclusive of the legal debate. The crucial factor in identifying
the correct legal analyis for determining whether a state's fetal tissue
transplantation regimen is constitutional is whether the regimen seeks to
regulate or prohibit the pre-transplantation abortion or the post-abortion
transplantation. While the former would lead straight into the sights of
Roe v. Wade,52 the latter probably lacks direct Roe protection. Both sce-
narios implicate Roe on the margin and involve the issue of the appropri-
ate legal management of abortion motivation. The former poses the
question of whether a state may legitimately ban a species of pregnancy
termination defined by a specific abortee motivation. The latter scenario
poses the question of whether a state may legitimately ban an activity
that follows a fundamentally protected abortion when the prohibited ac-
tivity was the motive for the abortion.
Contemporary attacks on Roe are familiar. Two avenues of judicial
back-peddling may be discerned. First, the Court has subjected the char-
acterization of the right to choose abortion as fundamental to more re-
strictive readings of the constitution,53 and subjected the espoused right
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), held:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician;
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses regulate the abor-
tion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health;
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.
53. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
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of abortion to an increasingly narrow interpretation. 4 Second, Roe's
description of the countervailing state interest in potential life as not
compelling until viability has received both technological"5 and philo-
sophical16 attacks.
Clearly, the battle over whether or not there is some all-embracing,
amorphous privacy right has been lost. What remains is the doctrine-
rich protection of a narrow range of marital, conception and abortion
decisions. Indeed, it was to this doctrine-rich approach that the respon-
dent in Bowers v. Hardwick 7 pandered. However, only Justice Black-
mun's dissent adopted the strategic doctrinalization that the respondents
sought: the duality of "decisional and spatial" privacy.5 8
Today's non-conceptual, doctrinalised Roe v. Wade, eking out its mea-
ger protection from a vulnerable Supreme Court majority, survives as a
laundry list of state do's5 9 and don'ts' and lacks the expansive reach of a
54. See, eg., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (white, J., dissenting). Cf Stevens, J., concurring at 2187-88.
55. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453-59 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Cf. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95
YALE L.J. 639 (1986).
56. See, eg., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, (1986).
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there was no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy).
58. Justice Blackmun argued that previous Supreme Court cases recognized these two distinct
types of privacy rights. Blackmun defined "decisional" privacy as protecting "certain decisions that
are properly for the individual to make," and "spatial" privacy as protecting "certain places without
regard for the particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them are engaged." Bowers,
478 U.S. at 204 (second emphasis in original). See infra text accompanying notes 84 and 100.
59. For example, requirements include: that the procedure be performed by a licensed physi-
cian, Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975); that written consent is obtained, Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v.Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976); and that records kept,
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976).
60. The state must refrain from impinging on the physician's professional judgment by dictat-
ing how, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979); when, Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (first trimester only); or where an abortion
should be performed, Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968 (1976). Following the first trimester, the state
has the burden of showing that there is a reasonable relationship between its regulation and the
preservation of maternal health. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 430-31 (1983).
Neither may the state dictate the content of the physician's disclosure or otherwise attempt to chill
or burden the decision, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
443-44 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); require the consent of any other person, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); interfere with the physician's
professional judgement as to the gestational age of the fetus, Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-
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fully articulated fundamental right. Nevertheless, a state statute which
prohibits a transplant motivated conception or abortion falls foul of even
a stripped down Roe v. Wade.
Consider a state prohibition on abortions for transplantation purposes,
or "pre-transplantation abortions." Hypothesize an established pattern
of blatant commercial fetal tissue farming. A state passes a tightly drawn
(i.e., non-vague61) prohibition. Would the woman-state interests balance
necessarily be answered in the same way as in Roe v. Wade? For exam-
ple, Missouri's recently enacted fetal tissue legislation62 seeks to prohibit
the harvesting abortion itself by stating,
No physician shall perform an abortion on a woman if the physician
knows that the woman conceived the unborn child for the purpose of pro-
viding fetal organs or tissue for medical transplantation to herself or an-
other, and the physician knows that the woman intends to procure the
abortion to utilize those organs or tissues for such use for herself or
another.6
3
Leaving aside the effortless vagueness challenge that could be mounted, 6
strict scrutiny will be applicable unless the fragile Roe majority crumbles
and demotes post-conception reproductive autonomy,65 or reinterprets
that fundamental right as applicable only to, for example, therapeutic or
genetic abortions, and not to tissue farming abortions.66
89 (1979); or adopt a position as to when life begins, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
Record-keeping protocols must not entail potential public disclosure. Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
61. Of course, therein lies the rub. Such statutes will almost always prove amenable to vague-
ness challenges. See infra text accompanying note 118.
62. H.B. No. 1479, 84th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (1988) (to be codified at Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 188.036) [hereinafter H.B. No. 1479.]
63. Id. at § 188.036(1).
64. See infra text accompanying note 118.
65. See supra note 54.
66. Presumably, an argument could be made that the reach of the Roe fundamental right
should be limited by reference to the arguable rationale for the finding of that right:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the wo-
man a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and phys-
ical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be in-
volved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will
consider in consultation.
On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's
1988]
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By its terms, the Missouri prohibition is applicable to first trimester
abortions. Thus, if strict scrutiny continues to apply, the state would
have to demonstrate some compelling interest to justify its prohibition on
transplant motivated abortions. Under Roe, obvious and legitimate state
interests such as maternal health and prenatal life are not compelling
during the first trimester.67 This is because "until the end of the first
trimester, mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal
childbirth."68 The state has an interest in reinforcing the Roe assump-
tion as to comparative maternal mortality. Therefore, just as the state
may require that even first trimester abortions must be performed by a
licensed physician,69 so, it might be argued that the state could insist that
a physician not consider the future transplantation when determining,
for example, the timing or method of abortion.7" However, such a state
interest could be satisfied with far less stringent regulation than banning
the abortion. Similarly, although it would be possible to manufacture a
state interest out of a comparison between the dangers to a transplant
donee and the donor abortee, such interest would not be compelling so as
to justify interference with a fundamental right, as the state could achieve
its purpose merely by banning the transplantation rather than the pre-
transplantation abortion. In other words, the banning of the abortion
itself would not be medically necessary.71
Absent the establishment of some other as yet unidentified "compel-
ling" interest, it must be concluded that state interferences with first tri-
mester abortions are restricted to those which "have no significant
impact on the woman's exercise of her right... where justified by impor-
tant state health objectives."'72 Roe and its progeny have not attempted
to distinguish between abortions based on the woman's motiviation. A
court which attempted to introduce any such distinction would place an
impossible strain on the physician-patient relationship. And any court
which sought to "modify" the decisional privacy of Roe by outlawing
right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in
whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone choose.& With this we do not agree.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (emphasis added).
67. And it is first trimester tissue that researchers seem primarily interested in harvesting. See
supra note 7.
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
69. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9-10 (1975).
70. For example, by erecting some institutional barrier between researchers and those perform-
ing abortions.
71. See generally Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1368 (7th Cir. 1988).
72. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983).
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certain motivations would actually destroy the core concept.7 3
IX. THE LIMITS OF REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
The Missouri statute attacks not just the abortion but also the motiva-
tion for the abortion by providing: "No person shall utilize the fetal or-
gans or tissue resulting from an abortion for medical transplantation, if
the person knows that the abortion was procured for the purpose of
utilizing those organs or tissue for such use."' 4 In this situation, the is-
sue that arises is whether a state ban on the transplant (not on the abor-
tion, but on its motivation) unconstitutionally chills the abortion
decision. 75  There is no indication that the Roe-delineated fundamental
right extends to any such peripheral aspect of the abortion decision. A
fortiori, neither would it extend to Missouri's prohibition of an induce-
ment to a motivation to the exercise of the protected right.76
It must be conceded that governmental interference with fetal tissue
disposal, experimentation, or transplantation is subject to Roe-derived
73. A similar issue arises in the context of our technological abilities to detect fetal gender,
which has induced state prohibition of sex-selective abortions. See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 81-26(8) (1987) ("No person shall intentionally perform an abortion with knowledge that the
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus"). These statutes
may be approached from two directions. First, is there any suggestion that the abortion right ex-
cludes fetal sex-selection motivation because the right is limited to, for example, terminations for
therapeutic or genetic reasons? Second, given that the state interest in prenatal life, that allows it to
restrict abortion, does not become compelling until the beginning of the third trimester, are there
any other legitimate state interests which might be compelling at an earlier time? For example, the
question might be whether a state has a legitimate and compelling interest in the prevention of a
male-female imbalance resulting from sex-selective abortions. See Green, The Fetus and the Law,
GENETICS AND THE LAW, 19, 21-22 (Milunsky & Annas eds. 1976). Consider also that in the
Indian state of Maharashtra, amniocentesis is only permitted to test for genetic disorders because of
a developing trend of aborting female fetuses, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
74. H.B. No. 1479 supra note 62, at § 188.036(2).
75. The California bill raised similar problems. It contained a provision aimed narrowly at
what is probably the most ethically troubling abortion-transplantation issue: donor specific tissue-
farming. Its narrow prohibition stated, "[n]o specific or named individual may be designated as a
transplant recipient ..." S.B. No. 2425; supra note 45, at § 7151.8(b).
76. The legislation prohibits inducements to conceive or abort for tissue farming purposes. H.B.
No. 1479, supra note 62, at § 188.036(3) provides: "No person shall offer any inducement, mone-
tary, or otherwise, to a woman or a prospective father of an unborn child for the purpose of conceiv-
ing an unborn child for the medical, scientific, experimental or therapeutic use of the fetal organs or
tissue.". H.B. No. 1479, supra note 62, at § 188.036(4) provides: "No person shall offer any induce-
ment, monetary or otherwise, to the mother or father of an unborn child for the purpose of procur-
ing an abortion for the medical, scientific, experimental or therapeutic use of the fetal organs or
tissue." Of course, this very dilution may help to establish vagueness. See infra text accompanying
note 118.
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scrutiny. However, under the terms of Roe, the validity of such govern-
mental interference will only be challengeable under this fourteenth
amendment privacy guarantee when the regulation directly or indirectly
interferes with the reproductive autonomy privilege. However, while
some psychological and informational burdens will be struck down, the
exact reach of the autonomy principle remains unclear.
One may argue for both vertical and horizontal expansion of the prin-
ciple. They differ, primarily, in emphasis. Vertical expansion seeks to
extend the reproductive autonomy principle beyond conception or termi-
nation to protect in vitro fertilization," fetal experimentation and trans-
plantation. Horizontal expansion seeks to extend the reproductive
autonomy shield to the physicians and researchers involved.
Horizontal expansion to any significant degree appears unlikely. The
attending physician of a woman seeking an abortion is entitled to "deriv-
ative constitutional protection."78 Notwithstanding the continued medi-
calization of the woman's reproductive autonomy,7 9 it remains clear that
"the rights of medical researchers are not fundamental under the
constitution."80
Notwithstanding some courts have sought to expand the protection of
the privacy principle to such attenuated situations as guaranteeing a phy-
sician access to his clinic.81 To qualify as unconstitutional, however, hin-
drances placed in the way of the physician must directly interfere with
77. See Terry, supra note 3, at 463-65, discussing inter alia the apparent concession by the
defendant Attorney General in Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. 111. 1983), that a
fundamental right to in vitro fertilization exists. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-26 § 6(7)
(1987) stating, "Nothing in this [section prohibiting commercial disposition or experimentation on a
fetus] is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.".
78. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'g. 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). See
also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64-65, 78-79 (1976); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445-49 (1983).
79. See Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of the Physi-
cian's Role in "Private" Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 183 (1985).
England's decriminalized abortion law is explicit in placing medicalization at the core of abortion
decision-making. See generally Terry, England in ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN
FETUS 75, 79-83 (Frankowski & Cole eds. 1987).
80. Wynn, 499 F. Supp. at 1322. See also Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 674 (E.D. La.
1984) ("The right of physicians to engage in their profession, although not recognized as a funda-
mental right, nonetheless is entitled under the Constitution to protection from arbitrary infringe-
ment"), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1986)(Margaret S. II).
81. See, eg., Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 227-30, 721 P.2d 918, 928-29 (1986), cert.
dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
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his ability to counsel or treat his patient who seeks an abortion. While it
is correct that the identity of one affected by any state abortion regula-
tion is essentially irrelevant, 2 to merit Roe-derived scrutiny, a physi-
cian's complaint must implicate the due process rights of his patients, not
merely his own equal protection rights.8"
Similarly, there seems little cause for optimism as to any vertical ex-
pansion of the autonomy principle. For example, in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,"g neither the majority nor the minority opinions of the Supreme
Court appear to support the further extension of the shield of reproduc-
tive autonomy to protect an activity such as fetal tissue transplantation.
The majority talked in terms of "a fundamental individual right to decide
whether or not to beget or bear a child," 5 and of a requirement that the
activity for which protection is sought must be connected to "family,
marriage or procreation." 6 In contrast, while the minority 7 recognized
a right of privacy with both "decisional and spatial aspects,"8" only the
dissenting voice of Justice Stevens envisioned anything more broadly
constructed.8 9
Thus, with the vertical and horizontal limits of Roe v. Wade at least
temporarily fixed, contemporary constitutional protection for fetal tissue
transplantation from preemptive state strikes will depend upon a two-
part strategy. Either the objections to a transplantation regulation must
relate directly to the core understanding of Roe, or must rely on a non-
privacy based argument.
82. See, eg., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 1980).
83. Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1984).
84. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
For a more attenuated reading of the privacy right, see Bering v. Share, 106 Wash.2d 212, 222-29,
721 P.2d 918, 928 (1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987). Cf Frisby v. Schultz, No. 87-168,
slip op. (Sup. Ct. June 27, 1988) (upholding the constitutionality of ordinance prohibiting picketing
near individual's residence in the face of first amendment challenges by anti-abortion protesters; the
court referred to residential privacy but did not allude to any concept of reproductive privacy in
examining whether there was a significant state interest present).
85. 478 U.S. at 190 (apparently approving of that characterization).
86. Id. at 191.
87. Blackmun J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens JJ.
88. 478 U.S. at 204.
89. 478 U.S. at 216 (joined by Brennan and Marshall JJ.). See also Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also
Schochet v. State, 75 Md.App. 314, 541 A.2d 183 (Md.App. 1988).
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X. SUCCESSFUL FETAL DISPOSAL AND EXPERIMENTATION
CHALLENGES
The above model is applicable to cases involving governmental regula-
tion of fetal disposal which has the effect of chilling or otherwise burden-
ing the woman's reproductive decision.90 Indeed, courts have struck
down fetal disposal regulations because the regulations financially91 or
psychologically92 burden a woman's abortion decision. 93
A small sample of the panoply of fetal experimentation regulation94
has also been scrutinized. However, these challenges have tended to
arise in the course of review of an entire post-Roe state abortion statute.
Thus, the reviewing courts may have regarded the experimentation
prohibitions as somewhat peripheral.95 Notwithstanding, the scrutiniz-
ing courts have shown little enthusiasm for extending the reproductive
autonomy principle to protect fetal research. As one district court said
of a state prohibition on fetal experimentation, "These provisions do not
impose any burden on the woman who is deciding whether to terminate
her pregnancy. They do not place any prior obstacle in the path of the
attending physician. '"96 This argument would apply as to a ban on fetal
tissue transplantation.
Ironically, this probably accurate statement regarding the effect of
such regulations on conception and termination (and ignoring the effect
on any broader reproductive or sexual freedoms), has offered one small
window of vulnerability for state regulation. This is because it follows
that the legislation will require strict scrutiny review if the woman's ter-
mination decision is shown to be burdened, or her physician's role im-
peded. In Margaret S. (I) 97 that crucial link was successfully forged
before the district court, enabling the plaintiffs to mount a Roe-based
90. See Terry, supra note 3, at 428-30.
91. See, eg., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd mem. sub noam. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
92. See, eg., Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351 (D. N.D. 1980).
93. Additional challenges have been successful on grounds of vagueness. See infra text accom-
panying note 127.
94. See supra text accompanying note 49.
95. In contrast, the courts have always treated state attempts to regulate fetal disposal as funda-
mental attacks on the abortion decision.
96. Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978), appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'g 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
97. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984) aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. La. 1980) is referred to hereinafter as Margaret S. (I).
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challenge to Louisiana's ban on fetal experimentation.9" This link was
posited on the theory that the experimentation regulation constituted an
indirect chilling of the reproductive decision. Specifically, the court was
prepared to accept that a state enforced denial of experimentation on a
woman's aborted fetus could deprive her (and, presumably, her physi-
cian) of potential research-derived information necessary to make future
conception or termination decisions."
This approach seems in accord with the decisional privacy rule es-
poused by the minority of the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick.1"
The approach gives content to the concept of decisional privacy because
it recognizes that the validity of a decision is inversely proportional to the
rational decisionmaker's information costs. Just as decisional privacy
will protect the woman from being burdened by information she neither
wants nor requires, 10 1 so it should follow that the reach of that informa-
tional privacy extends to ensuring the availability of certain information
she does want or require.102
Presume, however, that the legislation had contained instead an ex-
plicit ban on fetal tissue transplantation. Where is the denial of informa-
tional privacy that would cause a chilling effect on any reproductive
decision? A ban on fetal research may be suspect when it hinders the
provision of information to a woman regarding the likelihood of future
sibling hereditary defects, just as a state ban on amniocentesis would be.
However, it is distinctly arguable that the Roe-derived autonomy reaches
the end of its acceptable attenuation when we consider non-familial re-
search or transplantation. 10 3
Closely related to the "chilling" argument is the frequently espoused
statement that the pregnant woman's reproductive decisionmaking must
not be unduly burdened. The Supreme Court has refused to conclude
that this requires state funding of abortions."° However, the imposition
of a state regulation which has the effect of increasing the cost of an
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1988)
99. 597 F. Supp. at 673.
100. 478 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1986).
101. See generally City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, (1986).
102. See, eg., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976)
(Blackmun, J.).
103. See generally Terry, supra note 3, at 449-52.
104. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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abortion might be considered unconstitutionally burdensome. 105 If abor-
tion clinics and hospitals find that they can subsidize their terminations
by either selling fetal tissue for transplantation or supplying their own
transplantation teams, then a ban on transplantation would, in practical
terms, burden the woman's abortion decision. Unfortunately, much the
same factual observation could be made of a non-discriminatory state
ban on hospital bingo games. As the alleged burdening of the abortion
decision is seen as distanced from the decision itself so the Roe protection
will be considerably diluted.
XI. EQUAL PROTECTION
Absent an acceptance of such arguments as to the chilling effect or
burden on the abortion decision itself, conventional teaching dictates that
constitutional scrutiny of a fetal transplantation prohibition will be con-
siderably limited. However, a challenge could be mounted on a rational
connection theory similar to the scrutiny extended to the Louisiana ex-
perimentation statute in Margaret S. (II).106
The district court in that case found no legitimate state interest ration-
ally connected to denying researchers the right to engage in their profes-
sion. First, the state could not rely upon its interest in protecting human
life, because the prohibition extended to experimentation on a dead,
aborted fetus. Second, the state had enacted no equivalent regulation of
experimentation on a deceased person.10
7
Extrapolating from the decision in Margaret S. (II) to the fetal tissue
transplantation context, a case presumably would turn on whether the
state could supply a rational basis for a legislative distinction between the
regulation of the transplantation of fetal tissue as opposed to human tis-
sue, or tissue resulting from an induced rather than spontaneous
105. See, eg., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 434-
39 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983); Ragsdale v.
Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (7th Cir. 1988); Birth Control Centers, Inc. v. Reizen, 743 F.2d
352, 364-66 (6th Cir. 1984).
106. 597 F. Supp. 636, 674-75 (E.D. La. 1984). Cf. Margaret S. (1), 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 (E.D.
La. 1980)(holding, further, that, "[s]tatutes regulating human experimentation and in utero fetal
experimentation are a reasonable exercise of the State's police powers.") See generally Terry, supra
note 3, at 450.
107. The other form of discrimination in regulation which is common in post-Roe experimenta-
tion statutes turns on whether the abortion was induced or spontaneous.
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abortion. 10 8
The starting position for an examination of any state regulation of
transplantation is the universally adopted Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA). °9 However, the UAGA provides an incomplete answer.
While it makes legal the donation of a dead fetus110 and its receipt by
certain researchers, it contains no explicit statement that fetal transplan-
tation (or experimentation) is lawful."11 In fact, aside from the proce-
dure-dominated UAGA, there exists only a most rudimentary patchwork
of transplantation regulation, tissue origin notwithstanding. Neverthe-
less, three detectable regulatory trends may be emerging: first, encourag-
ing more active and principled self-regulation in this area, typically
through insistence upon the development by hospitals of transplant pro-
tocols; 112 second, regulating organ and tissue banks, and; 1 3 third, regu-
lating, and typically prohibiting, the commercial exploitation of human
tissue. 114
The suggestion from Margaret S. (II) 115 is that while a state might
have a legitimate interest in regulating tissue banks or commercial ex-
ploitation of tissue, legislation which regulates only fetal tissue or only
fetal tissue from induced abortions would not be rationally connected to
that interest.
Notwithstanding, the validity of even this narrow area of constitu-
108. Many of the state fetal experimentation statutes utilize this latter distinction. See Terry,
supra note 3, at 447 n.197.
109. 8A U.L.A. 34, 15-67 (1987). As used in the statute," 'Decedent' means a deceased individ-
ual and includes a stillborn infant or fetus." Id. at § l(b).
110. Quaere the applicability of UAGA to tissue from an aborted, non-viable fetus which is
transplanted while still "alive?"
111. See Terry, supra note 3, at 446.
112. See, eg., Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 38 (H.B. 1149); 1987 Conn. Acts, P.A. 173 (H.B. 7463);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3218(a) (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.241 (Baldwin 1988); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-39-15 (1987); Neb. Laws, L.B. 74; 1987 N.M. Laws, Ch. 74 (S.B. 196); 1987 N.C.
Sess. Laws, Ch. 719 (H 285); 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws, Ch. 28 (S.B.16). A slightly less diluted approach
to regulation is to establish some state supervisory or advisory council to review transplantation
procedures and recommend standards. See, eg., FLA. STAT. § 381.602 (1986); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 17 § 15 (Law. Co-op 1986).
113. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1602 to 2-1604 (1981 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 39-
3401A (1988).
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.01 (West 1987); 1987 Ill. Laws, P.A. 85-191 (H.B. 404);
1987 MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-408 (Supp. 1987); 1987 Nev. Stat. Ch. 641 (S.B. 485);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (Consol. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02 (Vernon Supp.
1986); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-7a (Supp. 1988); 1987 Wis. Laws, Ch. 97 (A.B. 23). See generally
National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 11 1984).
115. Sub noa. Margaret v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
Washington University Open Scholarship
546 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tional vulnerability may now be suspect. When Margaret S. (II) was ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Williams, concurring, dismissed all the
vagueness challenges' 16 and affirmed the district court judgement on the
basis that the statute failed the rational connection test. For Judge Wil-
liams, the absence of any comparable Louisiana restrictions on human
tissue experimentation, or evidence of any rational basis for singling out
the tissue from an induced abortion, robbed the statute of the required
"rational relationship to an important state interest." 1 7 In stark con-
trast, the majority opinion did affirm the district court's opinion but only
on the narrower ground of vagueness.
XII. VAGUENESS CHALLENGES
The district court in Margaret S. (II) had addressed the question of
vagueness and had concluded that the Louisiana prohibition on fetal ex-
perimentation was impermissibly vague because,
[I]t is impossible for a pathologist or other physician to distinguish or sepa-
rate fetal tissue from maternal tissue in the handling and treatment of tissue
which is the result of abortion [and] it is impossible for a pathologist or
other physician to distinguish tissue which is the product of an induced
abortion from that which is the product of a spontaneous abortion.118
In contrast, on appeal the Fifth Circuit found vagueness in the stat-
ute's silence as to the legality of the grey areas that lie somewhere be-
tween experimentation and routine medical tests.119 From the tenor of
that opinion it would appear that, once that distinction was clarified,
then the court would have no problems with the state ban on fetal experi-
mentation120 or, presumably, fetal tissue transplantation.
A vagueness challenge also succeeded before the district court in
Charles v. Carey.2 ' There a statutory disposition and experimentation
prohibition applied to "any fetus.., aborted alive." The court consid-
ered that the term "alive" was capable of covering such a broad spectrum
of indicia that it could not control the criminality of conduct.1 22
A court should sustain a similar challenge against most aspects of the
116. 794 F.2d at 1000-02.
117. 794 F.2d at 1002.
118. Margaret S. II, 597 F.Supp. 636, 675-76 (footnote omitted).
119. 794 F.2d at 999.
120. See, eg., Id. at 794 F.2d 999 n.13.
121. 579 F.Supp. 377 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (sufficient likelihood of unconstitutionality entitled plain-
tiffs to preliminary injunction).
122. 579 F.Supp. at 383.
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Missouri fetal tissue transplantation statute. Prohibitions involving
criminal sanctions therein are based upon such uncertainties as knowl-
edge of the motives of others.123 Further, it follows from Margaret S.
(II) 124 that it is unconstitutional in a situation such as this to shift the
risk of identifying the source of the fetal tissue to the transplanter.1 25
An alternate challenge could be posited on vagueness as to exactly
what conduct is prohibited or mandated. For example, a Cincinnati fetal
disposal ordinance required that aborted fetuses, "be interred, deposited
in a vault or tomb, cremated or otherwise disposed of in a manner ap-
proved by the Commissioner of Health."'126 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit stated that,
The parameters of prohibited or permitted activity must be ascertainable
from the statute or regulations implementing the statute. That is, there
must be some objective guidance. The portion of the instant Ordinance
permitting disposal in manners otherwise approved by the Health Commis-
sioner is purely subjective and open to ad hoc changes in policy. Conse-
quently, it fails to provide sufficient warning to parties as to what methods
will or will not be disapproved and therefore be subject to prosecution.127
Similarly, one may argue that the Missouri fetal tissue statute128 insuf-
ficiently identifies the proscribed conduct, by failing to be specific as to
whether it includes, for example, the transplantation of fetal blood,'29 or
the transplantation of human fetal tissue into animals. 130
123. See, eg., H.B. 1479, supra note 64, at § 188.036(1):
No physician shall perform an abortion on a woman if the physician knows that the woman
conceived the unborn child for the purpose of providing fetal organs or tissue for medical
transplantation to herself or another, and the physician knows that the woman intends to
procure the abortion to utilize those organs or tissue for such use for herself or another.
(emphasis added).
124. See supra note 118.
125. See, eg., H.B. 1479 supra note 62, at § 188.036(2): "No person shall utilize the fetal organs
or tissue resulting from an abortion for medical transplantation, if the person knows that the abortion
was procured for the purpose of utilizing those organs or tissue for such use." (emphasis added).
126. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1392 (6th Cir. 1987) (em-
phasis added).
127. 822 F.2d. at 1399. See also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 451-52 (1983).
128. H.B. 1479 supra note 62, at § 188.036(2). "No person shall utilize the fetal organs or tissue
resulting from an abortion for medical transplantation, if the person knows that the abortion was
procured for the purpose of utilizing those organs or tissue for such use." Id. (emphasis added).
129. Researchers believe that blood disorders such as leukemia, aplastic anemia and sickle-cell
anemia could be treated with fetal blood cells. McAuliffe, A Startling Fount of Healing, U.S. News
& World Report, Nov. 3, 1986 at 68.
130. For example, in order to test drugs which might have the same teratogenetic effects on
fetuses in utero.
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XIII. POLICY-MAKING AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
On March 22, 1988, Dr. Robert Windom, the Assistant Secretary at
the Department of Health and Human Services denied a request from the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) for permission to use fetal tissue for
transplantation. 13 1 The director of NIH, Dr. James Wyngaarden, has
interpreted the memorandum and moratorium to mean that future appli-
cations for research grants will be denied, and that already-allocated
funds for such research will be frozen pending the outcome of the advi-
sory committee meetings.1
32
The questions that Dr. Windom has asked the advisory committee to
consider succeed in conveying the complexity of the ethical and legal
issues involved. Furthermore, in many respects his questions are posed
in refreshingly neutral terms. 133 And, at this time, it would appear that
131. Date: March 22, 1988
From: Assistant Secretary for Health
Subject: Fetal Tissues in Research
To: Director, National Institutes of Health
I have given careful thought to your request to perform an experiment calling for the
implantation of human neural tissue from induced abortions into Parkinson's patients to
ameliorate the symptoms of this disorder.
This proposal raises a number of questions-primarily ethical and legal-that have not
been satisfactorily addressed, either within the Public Health Service or within society at
large. Consequently, before making a decision on your proposal, I would like you to con-
vene one or more special outside advisory committees that would examine comprehen-
sively the use of human fetal tissues from induced abortions for transplantation and advise
us on whether this kind of research should be performed, and, if so, under what
circumstances.
Pending the outcome of the advisory committee(s)' assessment and your subsequent re-
view, I am withholding my approval of the proposed experiment, and future experiments,
in which there is performed transplantation of human tissue from induced abortions. You
will note that this does not include research using fetal tissues from spontaneous abortions
or stillbirths. However, I would like the special advisory committee(s) to consider whether
current research procedures are adequate for the appropriate ethical, legal and scientific
use of tissue from these other sources.
I believe that greater input from outside professionals and also from the public will en-
hance protections for research participants and will help assure greater public confidence in
our work.
Memorandum from Dr. Robert Windom to Dr. James Wyngaarden, Mar. 22, 1988 (on file with
Washington University Law Quarterly).
132. Telephone interview with Ms. Barbara Harrison, N.I.H., April 28, 1988.
133. Among other questions, I would like the advisory committee(s) to address the
following:
1. Is an induced abortion of moral relevance to the decision to use human fetal tissue for
research? Would the answer to this question provide any insight on whether and how this
research should proceed?
2. Does the use of the fetal tissue in research encourage women to have an abortion that
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will be answered without resort to the ideological baggage surrounding
the abortion debate. 13
4
At this stage in the debate, the key for the federal policy-makers is to
accommodate the non-extremist viewpoints expressed in our pluralistic
society, and thus keep at bay all but the most determined state legisla-
tures.135 This tactic will essentially buy the time that is needed for a full
they might otherwise not undertake? If so, are there ways to minimize such
encouragement?
3. As a legal matter, does the very process of obtaining informed consent from the preg-
nant woman constitute a prohibited "inducement" to terminate the pregnancy for the pur-
poses of the research-thus precluding research of this sort, under HHS regulations?
4. Is maternal consent a sufficient condition for the use of the tissue, or should additional
consent be obtained? If so, what should be the substance and who should be the source(s)
of the consent, and what procedures should be implemented to obtain it?
5. Should there be and could there be a prohibition on the donation of fetal tissue be-
tween family members, or friends and acquaintances? Would a prohibition on donation
between family members jeopardize the likelihood of clinical success?
6. If transplantation using fetal tissue from induced abortions becomes more common,
what impact is likely to occur on activities and procedures employed by abortion clinics?
In particular, is the optimal or safest way to perform an abortion likely to be in conflict
with preservation of the fetal tissue? Is there any way to ensure that induced abortions are
not intentionally delayed in order to have a second trimester fetus for research and
transplantation?
7. What actual steps are involved in procuring the tissue from the source to the research-
ers? Are there any payments involved? What types of payments in this situation, if any,
would fall inside or outside the scope of the Hyde Amendment?
8. According to the HHS regulations, research on dead fetuses must be conducted in
compliance with State and local laws. A few States' enacted version of the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act contains restrictions on the research applications of dead fetal tissue after
an induced abortion. In those States, do these restrictions apply to therapeutic transplanta-
tion of dead fetal tissue after an induced abortion? If so, what are the consequences for
NIH-funded researchers in those States?
9. For those diseases for which transplantation using fetal tissue has been proposed, have
enough animal studies been performed to justify proceeding to human transplants? Be-
cause induced abortions during the first trimester are less risky to the woman, have there
been enough animal studies for each of those diseases to justify the reliance on the
equivalent of the second trimester human fetus?
10. What is the likelihood that transplantation using fetal cell cultures will be successful?
Will this obviate the need for fresh fetal tissues? In what time-frame might this occur?
Based on the findings and recommendations of the advisory committee(s), I would like you
to reconsider whether you would like to proceed with this kind of research, and if so,
whether you wish to make any changes, regulatory or otherwise, in your research review
and implementation procedures for both extramural and intramural programs.
Memorandum, supra note 131.
134. Reports indicate that the preliminary review by the Special Advisory Panel has been com-
pleted and favors continued research on or transplantation of fetal tissue. See, eg., Wall St. J., Nov.
7, 1988, at A14, Col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at A23, Col. 1.
135. Extremism is not limited to state legislatures. There have been reports that prior to the
convening of the advisory committee aides at the White House had drafted an executive order for
Presidential signature that would ban all fetal experimentation, research or transplantation except
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debate on the complicated policy decisions involved in fetal tissue trans-
plantation. The most appropriate response would be to institute a me-
dium-term code of conduct requiring:
(i) The imposition of a "Chinese Wall" between those involved in abor-
tion counselling and procedures and tissue harvesters and
transplanters.
(ii) The consent of the woman to the use of the fetal tissue for
transplantation.13 6
(iii) The randomizing of fetal tissue collection such that specific donees
may not be targeted.
(iv) The development of harvesting protocols to determine general accepta-
bility of tissue,137 including continued research as to the appropriate-
ness of using spontaneously aborted tissue.
(v) The development of criteria to determine fetal death. 138
This self-regulatory code of practice is not revolutionary in its ratio-
nales or mechanisms. Neither is it intended to have any permanency.
However, for the pragmatists in the middle of the debate, it will buy
some time until it becomes clear whether, for example, large scale labora-
tory culture of transplantable fetal cells is feasible or whether isolation of
the pivotal stem cell will otherwise permit rejection-free human blood
and tissue transplantation. 139
XIV. CONCLUSION
As research involving fetal tissue transplantation continues apace over-
seas, 140 we need exposure to, not foreclosure of, the debate. Both federal
and state policy-makers must resist the call for preemptive legislative
where it would directly benefit the fetus itself. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at A7, col. 5. Further-
more, on November 4, 1988 President Reagan signed an amendment to the National Organ Trans-
plant Act extending the prohibition on the sale of tissue for transplantation to fetal tissue and
organs. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, at A14, Col. 3.
136. This functions as an extension and reaffirmation of the woman's reproductive autonomy.
137. See, eg., J.-L. Touraine & F. Touraine, Greffe de tissusfoetaux: aspects medicaux et ethi-
ques, 27 (9) AGRESSOLOGE, 771 (1986).
138. Protocols appropriate to dealing with donations from respirator-dependent anencephalic
children also should be developed. See Harrison, Organ Procurement for Children: The Anencephalic
Fetus as Donor, THE LANcET, Dec. 13, 1986, at 1383, 1385. See also Case Studies, The Anencephalc
Newborn as Organ Donor, HAsTrNGs CENTER REP., Apr. 1986 at 21.
139. See generally Wall St. J., July 11, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
140. Shortly after the NIH moratorium was declared, the first Parkinson's disease related fetal
cell implant was performed in Britain. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at C3, col. 3. Experimentation
continues in Sweden, France, Mexico and China.
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strikes designed to form permanent and negative ethical and legal links
between tissue transplantation and abortion.
Most extremist or hastily drawn state prohibitions will fail in their
avowed purpose because the technology sought to be regulated is chang-
ing too quickly. Many-if not all-others will be struck down on one of
the grounds outlined above. Some courts might even see fit to extend the
reach of the reproductive autonomy principle so as to protect transplan-
tation. Yet those would be hollow victories. Fetal transplantation must
be judged on its own merits and not as an adjunct to, or a foil for, the
abortion debate.
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